The first 24 hours after a ransomware attack: a recovery roadmap
Nanda Teknoloji Engineering Team · · 8 min read
In brief
In a ransomware attack, the goal of the first 24 hours is to stop the spread, preserve evidence, determine the scope, and plan a controlled recovery from a clean backup. Shutting systems down in haste, connecting to backups, or paying the ransom can make the problem worse.
The goal of the first 24 hours after a ransomware attack comes down to four things: stop the spread, preserve forensic evidence, determine the scope of the impact, and plan a controlled recovery from a clean backup. The most expensive mistakes in this phase are products of panic: connecting to unencrypted backups, shutting servers down at random, making changes that alert the attacker, or entering ransom negotiations before the scope is known. The roadmap below presents an incident response flow, hour by hour. This is not legal or forensic advice; it should be adapted together with your organization’s incident response plan, legal counsel, and an expert response team. The guidance on CISA’s #StopRansomware page is also a good starting point for informing this plan.
The first hour: detection, isolation, and a decision-making structure
The job of the first hour is to move the event out of the “IT problem” category and into crisis management.
- Declare the incident formally. Appoint an incident response lead and open a crisis communication channel (if needed, a channel other than email; email may have been compromised).
- Isolate the affected systems from the network. You can unplug the network cable, shut down the switch port, or apply network isolation in the endpoint protection product. Cutting the power or shutting the system down can erase evidence held in memory; leave that decision to the incident response team.
- Protect the backups. Disconnect backup servers and their repositories from the network, reset the passwords and sessions of backup management accounts, and freeze backup jobs and retention policy changes. Attackers targeting backups is a common approach, so verifying that your immutable backup copy is intact is the first priority.
- Record the ransom note and samples of encrypted files. Take screenshots, and keep the file extensions, the text of the note, and any contact addresses.
- Review privileged accounts. You may need to disable the affected accounts and reset the passwords of privileged accounts, but set the order together with the response team.
Hours 1-6: Determining scope and preserving evidence
At this stage, you look for answers to the questions “how much was affected, where did the attacker get in, and are they still inside?”
- Which servers, endpoints, file shares, and cloud accounts were affected? Build an inventory.
- Is there any sign that data was exfiltrated before encryption? In many incidents, encryption is only the final step.
- Copy the logs (identity, VPN, email, firewall, endpoint) to a central, secure location.
- If you need support from outside experts (an incident response firm, insurance, legal counsel), bring them in now.
- Can temporary manual workarounds be put in place for critical business processes? Talk to the business owners.
It is tempting to clean the systems and restart them right away, but returning before the entry path is closed can lead to a repeat of the same attack.
Decision table: who does what in the first 24 hours?
| Time window | Main goal | Owner | Output |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0-1 hours | Isolation, incident declaration | Incident response lead, IT | Affected systems disconnected from the network, crisis channel open |
| 1-6 hours | Scope, evidence, setting up communication | IT, security, legal | Impact inventory, evidence copies, notification plan |
| 6-12 hours | Closing the entry path, preparing a clean environment | Security, infrastructure | Credentials reset, clean network segment ready |
| 12-24 hours | Recovery plan and return of the first critical systems | IT, business owners | Priority order, first restores from a verified clean backup |
Hours 6-12: Closing the entry path and communication
- Find and close the entry vector. It could be stolen credentials, open remote access, an unpatched service, or a phishing email. Connecting clean systems to the network without knowing this is risky.
- Renew all privileged credentials. Domain administrators, service accounts, backup and cloud management accounts, API keys.
- Manage internal communication. Give employees short, clear, regular updates: what should not be used and who will be calling.
- Plan external communication. Customers, business partners, regulators, insurance, and law enforcement. If a personal data breach is suspected, assess notification obligations under the regulations of the KVKK Authority together with legal counsel.
- The ransom decision. Payment is a decision with managerial, legal, and ethical dimensions, and the data may not come back. The decision should be made in the crisis management team, with legal advice; IT should not decide alone.
Hours 12-24: Controlled recovery from a clean backup
Recovery is not just “restoring files”; it is about building a trustworthy foundation.
- Prepare a clean, isolated recovery environment. A separate network segment, reset credentials, updated endpoint protection.
- Verify that the backup is clean. When did the infection begin? To identify the last trusted point before encryption, examine the logs and backup history. Rolling back to an infected version repeats the problem.
- Prioritize. Identity services, DNS, and the core network first; then business-critical applications. The previously defined RTO and RPO targets serve as a guide for priorities.
- Validate every restored system. Malware scanning, patch status, configuration, integrity checks.
- Return in stages. Bring systems into production not all at once but in groups you can monitor.
- Record every step. Which system was restored from which backup, when, and who verified it?
If preparation has been done, this phase passes with far less stress. To rehearse a recovery scenario in advance, see the disaster recovery test checklist article; for the fundamentals of backup architecture, see the 3-2-1-1-0 backup rule article. If a disaster recovery environment is standing ready at a second location, continuing critical services from there while production is cleaned is also an option.
Common mistakes in the first 24 hours
- Leaving the backup server connected to the network. The backup can also be encrypted or deleted.
- Shutting down or rebuilding systems. Forensic evidence is lost, and the entry path remains unknown.
- Returning before closing the entry path. If the attacker has stayed in the system, they will encrypt again.
- Resetting passwords only on the affected systems. All privileged accounts must be reset.
- Running communication in a scattered way. Appoint a single crisis communication lead.
- Not discussing the recovery order with business owners. The technical order can conflict with business priority.
- Not keeping records. A timeline is needed later for legal, insurance, and audit processes.
After the incident: Making the lessons permanent
The work does not end when the first 24 hours are over. The root cause of the incident should be analyzed, weak points closed, the backup and DR plans reviewed, and exercises rescheduled. The Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, and Recover functions in NIST’s Cybersecurity Framework offer a useful framework for structuring post-incident improvement areas.
The difference prepared organizations make
The same attack ends very differently at a prepared organization and an unprepared one. In the prepared organization, who will make decisions, which channel will be used, and which systems will be recovered first have been written down in advance. In the unprepared organization, the first hours are spent arguing over “who is in charge?”, “where is the backup?”, and “which system comes first?”
The preparations that can be made before an attack are as follows:
- Write an incident response plan and keep it accessible in print or offline. It must be reachable even when the network is down.
- Keep the critical contact list up to date. Management, legal, outside experts, insurance, providers.
- Prepare the system inventory and dependency map. Which system depends on which, and what is the recovery order?
- Harden the backup architecture. An immutable copy and a separate identity plane under the 3-2-1-1-0 rule.
- Rehearse recovery. Run restore-from-backup drills and tabletop scenarios.
- Tighten remote access and privileges. Multi-factor authentication, privileged account management, patching, and segmentation.
Example first-24-hours flow
In a hypothetical example, early in the morning, someone notices that file extensions have changed on several file servers. The IT manager declares the incident, disconnects the affected servers from the network, and also isolates the backup management console from the network. Around the same hours, the security team sees in the identity logs that there was an abnormal remote access session the previous night. This information provides the first clue about the entry vector.
Toward noon, the organization restores identity services from the immutable copy into a clean environment, renews the privileged accounts, and validates the first critical applications in an isolated segment. Toward evening, the priority list is settled with the business owners and a staged return plan is made for the next day. This flow shows the difference between planned, recorded progress and a response driven by panic.
Decision summary
- Isolate first, understand afterward; preserve evidence instead of shutting down and deleting.
- Secure the backups and backup management accounts in the first hour.
- Do not return to a clean environment before closing the entry path.
- Recover from a clean, verified backup, in priority order and in stages.
- Manage the legal, communication, and regulatory notification processes from the start.
Moving forward with Nanda Teknoloji
Nanda Teknoloji carries out the discovery, design, migration, and operation steps in projects like these: designing an immutable backup and recovery architecture before an attack, recovery exercises, and controlled return after an incident. For our related solutions, see the backup solutions and disaster recovery center pages.